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Abstract 
While promotion is an important mechanism for allocating labor within organizations, relatively 
little is known about the determinants of promotion in the highly diverse and traditionally 
heavily regulated Australian labor markets. This study uses unique data from the Victorian Public 
Sector Census 2004 to identify the extent and nature of bias in the promotion process. 
Specifically, we use the promotion histories of 16,675 public sector employees to investigate the 
existence of discrimination in promotion on the basis of gender, disability and cultural diversity. 
We find that some differences exist in the rate of promotion on the basis of gender, and to a 
lesser extent, of birthplace, but, importantly, most of these are due to differences in 
endowments. There are effectively no differences in promotion on the basis of disability. We 
find that the main driver of promotion in Victorian public sector labor markets is worker effort 
and performance. Compared to labor markets elsewhere, the Australian public sector is relatively 
free of discrimination in promotions. 
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1.     Introduction 
Since Doeringer and Piore (1971), economists’ fascination with the operation of internal labor 
markets has grown.1 While they take many forms, internal labor markets are often characterized 
by well-defined career ladders and the associated attachment of wages to jobs, relatively long-
term employment contracts, the existence of ‘ports of entry’, and a pronounced use of 
bureaucratic mechanisms for the allocation of labor within the firm. These internal markets tend 
to reduce, but not eliminate, the role for external labor markets in the allocation and pricing of 
labor resources (see Bayo-Moriones and Ortín-Ángel 2006). Firms that rely relatively heavily on 
internal labor markets are known often as career firms.2 An indispensable component of career 
firms is internal mobility and career advancement through the internal matching of workers to 
jobs, i.e., promotion (McCue 1996).3 From the perspective of a worker, career progression is a 
collection of several individual experiences, including salary growth, advancement/vertical 
movement along job ladders, job opportunities in other organizations, and rising status and 
recognition.  
An important issue is the existence of bias in promotion on the basis of worker 
characteristics that are independent of worker performance. Indeed, the issue of gender and 
racial differences in promotion is an extension of gender and racial differences in pay (for 
reviews see, for example, Altonji and Blank 1999 and Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005). 
With salary growth linked to promotions and responsibility levels, discrimination in promotion 
becomes a causal factor in pay inequity.4 
The public sector is of particular interest in this regard. In many countries, the public 
sector can be seen to be a leader in advocating and implementing policies that promote equality 
of opportunity and the eradication of discrimination. This is at least in part because in many - 
but not all - countries employers in the public sector are probably more sensitive to community 
attitudes and policy trends, with respect to issues relating to discrimination, than their 
counterparts in the private sector. Indeed, an important difference between public and private 
sector labor markets is the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to achieve objectives for the 
public sector that differ from private sector firms (see Gregory and Borland 1999).  
While their specific characteristics differ over time and across countries, there is evidence 
that internal labor markets have been an important feature of labor markets for a very long time. 
For example, internal labor markets have been widespread in the U.K. (Siebert and Addison 
1991) and the U.S. (see for example: Jacoby 1984; Baker and Holmstrom 1995; Groshen and 
Levine 1998; Owen 2001; Levine 2002; and Gibbs and Hendricks 2004). Internal labor markets 
are also a defining feature of Japanese firms (Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa 2000). They have also 
been found to exist to varying degrees in many countries, such as Taiwan (Lin 2005), Denmark 
(Eriksson and Werwatz 2005) and Sweden (Lazear and Oyer 2004). Presenting interesting case 
studies for Canada and England, respectively, Hamilton and MacKinnon (2001) and Howlett 
(2004) trace the emergence of internal labor markets to large railway companies. Seltzer and 
Merrett (2000) and Seltzer and Simons (2001) show that internal labor markets have existed in 
the Australian banking industry as early as the 1880s.  
Virtually all large organizations (in both the public and private sectors) have now adopted 
some form of internal labor matching procedures. While the evidence points to the widespread 
existence of internal labor markets within firms, ‘extended’ internal labor markets have been 
                                                 
1 Internal labor markets have been a constant source of interest also for sociologists and organisation researchers 
(Elvira 2001). 
2 It is important to note, however, that in practice virtually all firms use a combination of internal and external labor 
markets and operate in more than one market, depending on the occupational groups employed.  
3 While careers obviously can progress by employees seeking opportunities outside the firm, our focus in this paper 
is solely on career progression within a firm or a particular public sector agency. 
4 Many studies have explored gender differences in wages arising from promotion. Examples include: Killingsworth 
and Reimers 1983; Olson and Becker 1983; Gerhart and Milkovich 1989; Hersch and Viscusi 1996; McCue 1996; 
Pudney and Shields 2000; Francesconi 2001; Johnston 2002; Booth et al. 2003; and Gibbs and Hendricks 2004. 
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found also between firms and universities (Brunel 2005) and across establishments within diverse 
firms (Kaplan and Pierce 2005).5 Although there may have been some tendency to shift away 
from internal labor markets in many countries in recent years (Cappelli 1999; Magnani 2003), 
they remain an important institutional feature of labor markets, with millions of employees 
affected by them.  
Despite the global importance of internal labor markets, surprisingly little is known about 
promotion in firms and labor markets outside the UK and the US. Correspondingly, relatively 
little is known about the impact of human capital on the prospects of promotion, and the role of 
gender and job and worker characteristics on career progression. Even less is known about 
promotion of either employees with a disability or those from a culturally diverse background. 
Most of the extant research has used data from the U.K. (Groot and van den Brink 1996; Dolton 
and Kidd 1998; Pudney and Shields 2000; and Booth et al. 2003), or the U.S. (Hersch and Viscusi 
1996; Pergamit and Veum 1999; McDowell et al. 2001; Gjerde 2002; and Ginther and Hayes 
2003). Recently, researchers have began to explore the determinants of promotion in other 
nations. Some examples include Garcia-Crespo (2001) and Bayo-Moriones and Ortín-Ángel 
(2006) for Spain, and Pekkarinen and  Vartiainen (2006) for Finland.  
There are currently no published empirical investigations on the determinants of 
promotion in Australian labor markets. The aim of this paper is to explore the key determinants 
of promotion within Australian public sector labor markets. Using a unique dataset (the 
Victorian Public Sector Census 2004), we estimate an ordered probit model to investigate the 
existence and magnitude of bias in promotion on the basis of gender, disability and cultural 
diversity, after controlling for both human capital characteristics (such as qualifications and 
experience) and job characteristics.6  
This paper makes four important contributions to this literature. First, it identifies the 
key determinants of promotion in Australian public sector labor markets.7 Australia presents an 
interesting case study. At one time, Australia was regarded as having one of the most, if not the 
most, regulated labor markets in the OECD (Killingsworth 1990). Freeman (2006) noted 
recently the importance of learning from the labor market experiences of countries like Australia. 
Australia has an interesting blend of a very diverse workforce (with a large intake of migrants and 
the promotion of multiculturalism), together with active government interventions in labor 
markets and initiatives against discrimination.8 
Second, the study informs on the impact of antidiscrimination legislation on bias in 
promotion. Given the nature of her labor markets and the extent of regulatory intervention, 
Australia is a particularly interesting case for the exploration of the impact of legislation on 
discrimination on career differences on the basis of gender and cultural background. With such a 
                                                 
5 There are actually several types of internal labor markets, and firms can simultaneously operate more than one type 
(see Osterman 1984 and Bills 1987). 
 
6 In terms of economic importance, Victoria is the second largest Australian state and is very representative of the 
rest of Australia.  
7 While there are Australian studies that have expored related dimensions such as discrimination in training (Miller 
1994) and occupational disadvantage (Borooah and Mangan 2002), such studies have not analyzed the determinants 
of promotion. The one exception is the study by Austen (2004) that was limited to gender differences in professorial 
positions in Australian universities. 
8 There exist an array of Australian Federal and State legislations against discrimination on the basis of race, 
indigenous status, gender, age and disability. Examples of Federal legislations include: the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975; the Sex Discrimination Act 1984; the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986; 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992; the Native Title Act 1993; the Workplace Relations Act 1996; and the Age Discrimination 
Act 2004. Additionally, all Australian States have adopted strategies that promote EEO programs in their public 
sectors. Examples include: Part 9A of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977; the Strategy for Employment of People with 
Disabilities in the South Australian Public Sector, authorised under Section 67(2) of the Public Sector Management Act 1995; 
and the Equal Opportunity in Public Employment Act 1992 in Queensland. Australian States are relatively homogenous 
and Federal legislation helps maintain this homogeneity. 
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wide range of antidiscrimination legislation that has existed in many countries, in many cases for 
decades, we would expect to find no discrimination, especially in the public sector. However, 
while discriminatory laws and practices have been removed, historical bias and disadvantage can 
still shape current stereotypes and prejudices. Moreover, bias may be conscious or unconscious. 
In the presence of legislation, conscious discrimination is likely to be covert. The law is unable to 
cover all contingencies and promotion committees frequently have some degree of discretion.  
As Booth et al (2003, p.302) note: “… the law cannot effectively force equal promotion rates in 
practice, nor does it limit the wage distribution that arises as firms respond to outside offers.” 
Hence, even in the face of extensive legislation, the extent and nature of discrimination is an 
empirical issue. Further, while the main focus in the policy community is the extent of overall (or 
net) bias, we are interested also in identifying the existence of biases with respect to certain 
attributes. For example, do females receive the same benefits in terms of promotion as males 
from formal qualifications? Do workers with a disability get the same benefits in terms of 
promotion as abled-bodied workers from working full-time? These incremental biases are more 
likely to pass through the legislative net and their existence sheds important light on the channels 
through which bias is transmitted.  
Third, existing studies have tended to use data that is: (a) exclusively related to the private 
sector; (b) combining observations from the private and public sectors; or (c) exploring specific 
public sub-sectors such as nursing (Pudney and Shields 2000), education (Eberts and Stone 
1985), and health, education and welfare (Borjas 1978). We contribute to the relatively small pool 
of studies that explores the promotion process for the entire public sector (see, for example, Naff 
1994).  
Fourth, the main focus of the existing promotion studies has been the existence of 
discrimination in male-female, black-white and sometimes Hispanic promotion. Our study is one 
of the very few to explore discrimination in promotion on the basis of disability, as well as the 
other Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) variables. While several studies have explored 
salary differentials for workers with disabilities (see for example: Borjas 1982; Johnson and 
Lambrinos 1985; Baldwin and Johnson 1994; Hendricks et al. 1997; Kidd et al. 2000; DeLeire 
2001; Brazenor 2002; Charles 2003; and Thoursie 2004), there is a dearth of research on the 
impact of disability on promotions.9  For the U.S. there is evidence that discrimination with 
respect to disability has persisted even after the introduction of relevant legislation (Cesare et al. 
1990; and Miceli et al. 2001). The experience of other nations is important for comparison 
purposes. 
Section 2 reviews the theory on promotion, and discusses the nature of internal labor 
markets in the Victorian Public Sector. The dataset is discussed in section 3, as is the 
econometric methodology. The results are presented and interpreted in section 4. The paper is 
concluded in section 5. 
 
2.     Theory and Prior Analysis 
Labor market experience in a career firm differs from that predicted by the theory of perfectly 
competitive labor markets (Gibbons and Waldman 1999). For example, in career firms there is a 
greater reliance on administrative decree for the allocation of labor rather than market forces. 
The effect of this on promotion is a priori indeterminate. Administrative decree can distort 
competitive market outcomes, either decreasing the extent of differences in promotion rates and 
wage relativities or increasing them.  Thus, if there exists pre-labor market discrimination that 
                                                 
9 This literature has explored employment (labor hiring and labor market participation) effects, but not promotion 
effects (see Baldwin and Johnson 1995, Kidd et al. 2000, Baldwin and Johnson 2000 and Beegle and Stock 2003). A 
noticeable exception is Lewis and Allee (1992) who found that in the US disabled employees had lower grades and 
fewer promotion rates. Our interest is on the careers of disabled workers that are hired.  
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would disadvantage female applicants, administrative decree can offset this by biasing promotion 
procedures in favor of females. Alternatively, administrative decree can reinforce broader biases 
against women and institutionalize bias in practice. 
There is currently no accepted unifying theory of promotions. Researchers typically draw 
upon various strands of theory, such as the theory of tournaments, and from specific models 
such as Lazear and Rosen (1990) and Booth et al. (2003).10 Standard economic theory establishes 
firmly that voluntary exchange and factor mobility is wealth and welfare enhancing. This applies 
equally to mobility within firms. The optimal path of a career is driven by productivity. However, 
this path is influenced by external and internal labor market distortions. Examples of these 
distortions include legislation and regulation imposed externally on the firm, and factors such as 
unionization, and biases and inefficiencies in the firm’s own internal governance and promotion 
processes. Productivity is revealed to a firm through actual performance, and the potential to 
perform at higher levels is signaled to the firm in various ways. That is, promotability is a 
function of past performance and expected future performance.  
Promotions have two salient features. First, promotions are by and large based on 
relative productivities – promotion is given to the best applicant rather than the one that is good 
in an absolute sense. This arises because often it is easier to observe relative productivities than it 
is to observe absolute productivities. Moreover, budget constraints often result in qualified 
applicants missing out on promotion.  
Second, promotion is a mechanism for internal labor mobility within an organization 
and, is in many ways, a substitute to labor mobility between organizations. In a career firm, job 
allocation tends to occur from the pool of insiders, with limited competition from outsiders.11 
This preference in favor of insiders is more likely to occur the more risk adverse employers are, 
and the easier (harder) it is to observe the abilities of insiders (outsiders). Chan (1999) shows that 
in many organizations it is only when outside applicants are substantially better than the insiders 
that they will be considered for appointment.  
From the employers’ perspective, promotion is a sorting device, as it helps to match job 
requirements with worker abilities and productivities. Promotion is also an essential component 
of a set of pay-for-performance incentive schemes (Prendergast 1999). In this sense, promotion 
is both a reward for exerting extra effort, as well as a catalyst that is expected to induce greater 
effort (Audas, Barmby and Treble 2004). 
Promotions work best as an inducer of effort if a large number of employees compete, 
which limits the opportunities for collusion to shirk (Lazear 1998). However, if there is too 
much competition for promotion, there will be less cooperation and this may hinder the on-the-
job transfer of knowledge and training (Lazear 1989), a proposition supported by Australian data 
(see Drago and Garvey 1998). As an alternative to tournaments, promotion could be based on 
seniority, providing an incentive for workers to invest in firm specific human capital (Becker 
1975), but potentially delaying the matching of young productive workers to higher positions.  
                                                 
10 In Lazear and Rosen’ model, women have both an absolute and comparative advantage in non-market work (e.g. 
house duties). Consequently, women have less attachment to the workforce, driving employers to prefer to promote 
men to women. In Lazear and Rosen’s model, women can get promoted, but to do so they need to be more able 
than men. It follows that in this model, females are likely to get higher wages than males for equivalent promotions, 
because the promoted females are more productive. The Booth et al. (2003) model also revolves around outside 
opportunities, but this is driven mainly by market opportunities. Booth et al. argue that if discrimination restricts 
female mobility or if internal labor market practices are such that female outside offers are less likely to be matched, 
females will receive a lower wage for each promotion, than an equivalent male. In the Lazear and Rosen model, 
women are less likely to be promoted but receive more than men do for each promotion. In the Booth et al. model 
females are just as likely to be promoted but receive less than men do for each promotion. Note however that the 
Booth et al. is more general and does contain the Lazear and Rosen results as a special case. 
11  Where competition with outsiders exists, it maybe token, with the insider having the front running for the job, 
unless the outsider is significantly better. The relative importance of competition from outsiders varies across 
organizations as well as over time. 
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From the employees’ perspective, promotion enables salary growth, career progression, 
rising status and rising recognition. Promotion is a clear signal of recognition from the employer. 
Promotion often involves more challenging work with greater non-pecuniary benefits, and 
potentially offers greater job attachment (see, for example, Fairris 2004). Moreover, where 
salaries are attached to positions rather than individuals, promotion becomes an important 
source of salary growth (Wise 1975). 
 
2.1     Bias in promotion 
Bias, or discrimination, in promotion systems can be positive or negative, and reflects the extent 
to which a worker’s expected returns from promotion are influenced due to personal worker 
characteristics or attributes that are unrelated to their effort or performance. The expected 
returns to the individual from the promotion process over time may be affected by a change in 
the prospects for promotion and/or a change in the actual return from a promotion. For 
example, negative discrimination in a promotion process could exclude women from some job 
opportunities (e.g. glass ceiling effects), reduce their rate of advancement in any classification, or 
reduce the pay increment for any promotion received.12 Bias can arise at all stages of the 
promotion process. It can arise with respect to the short-listing of candidates, the interview 
stage, as well as level of placement if a promotion is awarded. Moreover, the discrimination can 
be institutionalized in a formal sense through administrative guidelines or it can be reflected in 
the attitudes and actions of employers and their agents, either overtly or covertly. 
            Historically, bias against females in promotion was transparent and institutionalized in 
the Australian public sector. A dual wage system ensured males earned more than females and 
the career options for females were constrained. Sawer (2001) notes that: 
 
“This rationale for restricting women to routine rather than career positions was still 
influential at the time of the Second World War. R.S. Parker wrote in his 1942 review of 
public service recruitment that there was some evidence that women were "more 
adaptable to monotonous work than men", so their employment in a separate class 
would free up officers "capable of and destined for more responsible tasks" (Parker 1942: 
223). 
 
In the past, females encountered a truncated career path in the Australian public sector. For 
example, a bar used to exist that prevented the employment of married women. With the advent 
of equal opportunity legislation and affirmative action, this situation has changed. Sawer (2001) 
notes that in 2000, women in the Australian Public Service constituted 24 percent of the Senior 
Executive Service (SES), as contrasted with 0.3 percent of the (then equivalent) Second Division 
in 1974. 
Bias can also be less transparent, but occur through higher criteria for promotion being 
applied to females, resulting in fewer promotions for them. Organizations can have clearly 
developed policies and procedures that try to prevent discrimination in promotion and try to 
facilitate efficiency in the internal labor market allocation process. However, in practice there 
could well be a significant gap between policy adoption and policy implementation. Even if 
administrative decree and procedures dictate that panels be free of bias, panels have an inherent 
degree of discretion. With imperfect monitoring of the selection and promotions process, the 
principal-agent problems can lead to biased promotion outcomes. Indeed, promotion decisions 
may be more prone to discrimination because they tend to be less open to external scrutiny than 
hiring decisions (see Baldi and McBrier 1997).  
There is an important difference between gender differences in promotions and 
differences in promotion because of gender. Differences in promotion can arise from endowment 
                                                 
12 Differences in promotion outcomes may arise also through self-selection effects. For example, Naff (1995) notes 
that if females perceive that they have limited promotion opportunities, this will impact on their career paths. 
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effects (such as human capital) that may or may not be associated with gender differences. They 
can arise also because of underlying bias (discrimination between groups that is unrelated to the 
work skills and attributes possessed) and incremental bias (such as differences in returns to skills on 
the basis of gender). Total bias is the sum of underlying and incremental bias.  
The endowment effect can either reinforce or cancel out the incremental bias, so that it is 
not possible to identify the extent and the direction of the bias in promotion by examining 
simple group averages. For example, if women are better educated than men they will tend to 
fare better in the promotion process than men. Where there is negative discrimination in the 
system, the bias may not be sufficient to offset the value of their superior human capital 
attributes. So even with significant negative bias in the process, women could be more successful 
in the promotion system than men. Similarly, if the bias is positive towards women, a 
comparison of observed male and female promotion returns will not show how much was due 
to human capital attributes and how much is due to positive discrimination, as both factors 
would tend to push up female promotion performance relative to that of males. It is for this 
reason that researchers analyze marginal effects and apply decomposition techniques. 
 
2.2       Endowment Effects 
The endowment effect is a measure of the differences in promotion that arise from differences 
in human capital. For example, if tenure and formal qualifications are important determinants of 
performance in the workplace and females have fewer years of tenure and lower levels of 
qualifications, then they will, ceteris paribus, experience fewer promotions. The reduced 
promotions in this case however do not reflect bias in the promotion process. Indeed, in these 
cases, the difference in probability of promotion reflects efficiency – the mechanisms of the 
internal labor market are allocating labor on the basis of relative productivities. Furthermore, 
differences in endowments that arise from pre-labor market discrimination and/or reflect 
individual preferences cannot be said to reflect discrimination in promotion or discrimination by 
the current employer.13  
           Endowment effects are important also to workers with a disability. Messer Pelkowski and 
Berger (2003) argue that workers with health problems are more likely to remain with their 
current employer as they are less mobile (see also Baldwin and Schumacher 2002), increasing the 
prospect of promotion. At the same time, they are less likely to be in full-time employment 
(Schur 2003), and consequently acquire less labor market experience, decreasing the prospects of 
promotion. Miceli, Harvey and Buckley (2001) note that discrimination against people with 
disabilities need not be conscious. Detecting discrimination is particularly difficult as exclusion 
from positions could be due to discrimination or due to disabilities preventing the disabled from 
performing the tasks, even with employers changing facilities. 
 
2.3      Incremental Bias 
The incremental bias measures bias in the returns to specific endowments. For example, if the 
probability of promotion from possessing a PhD is lower for females than males, then the 
promotion process is biased against females with comparable incremental differences in 
endowments. Incremental biases can be seen also as a way of introducing positive discrimination, 
for example as a means of offsetting initial bias at the time of appointment. Numerous factors 
contribute to incremental bias and it is possible for one component of the incremental bias to 
favor one group, while a different component favors another group. Hence, identifying the 
                                                 
13 However, if employers prefer to train males, then females will ceteris paribus possess fewer endowments. 
Consequently, part of the endowment effect would then result from discrimination. For our sample, 9.2% of 
females received employer financial support either for further study or training, compared to 9.7% of males. 
Running a simple binary probit of financial assistance regressed against the EEO dummy variables confirms that 
there are no gender differences in support for training. 
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endowment effect and the various incremental biases, and consequently detecting the degree and 
direction on net bias in promotion is an empirical issue. 
 
2.4     Prior Empirical Research 
The extant empirical research into promotions can be divided into three groups. First, there is 
the group of early studies that explored some of the determinants of promotion, but without 
considering discrimination; examples include the studies by Abraham and Medoff (1985) and 
Mills (1985). Second, there is a growing pool of studies that investigates the degree of 
discrimination in promotion. For example, Pergamit and Veum (1999) found that women, blacks 
and Hispanics were less likely to be promoted than white men. Third, there is a group of studies 
that explores the impact of discrimination in promotion on salaries (some of these are listed in 
footnote 4). The existing international studies produce mixed results (see Cobb-Clark 2001 for a 
recent review) of the empirical studies. For example, Booth et al. (2003) found that gender did 
not contribute to differences in promotion in Britain, while Gjerde (2002) found that females 
were less likely to be promoted in the USA. 
             Relatively little is known about promotions in Australia. The extant research has focused 
on issues such as: satisfaction with career progression (Lingard and Lin 2004); the impact of 
promotion opportunities on work effort (Drago 1991); the characteristics of workers receiving 
promotion (Fraser 2000); impact of promotions on willingness of workers to cooperate (Drago 
and Garvey 1998); and the impact of career interruptions on career progression (Rimmer and 
Rimmer, 1997), Brown and Jones (2004) and Arun, Arun and Borooah (2004). There have been 
some case studies (such as Brown 1997), but econometric analysis of Australian data is rare. 
 
3.     Data and Methodology 
The present study involves an econometric analysis of career progression equity in the Victorian 
Public Sector (VPSct), using data from the recently completed Victorian Public Sector Census 
2004.14 The Census was conducted between March and May 2004, with 19,526 respondents from 
105 public sector organizations and 91 government schools. The Census was distributed to all 
staff in the Victorian Public Service (a sub-sector within VPSct) and to selected organizations in 
the other sub-sectors such as Water, Health, University/TAFE and Schools, with questionnaires 
distributed physically at workplaces, as well as via the internet. Most (51%) of the respondents 
were employed by the Victorian Public Service. The overall response rate was 25.5%. However, 
because of missing observations for several of the key variables, the sample used for the 
multivariate analysis is for our preferred specification reduced to 16,675.15 
The Census collected data on a broad range of Equal Employment Opportunity groups 
(EEO), individual characteristics, work and promotion histories and human capital 
investments.16 Specifically, we have: 9,881 observations for the Victorian Public Service; 593 for 
Water; 3,769 for Health; 2,836 for the University/TAFE; and 491 for the School sub-sectors, 
respectively. The key advantage of the dataset is that it is not limited to a single firm. By covering 
an entire sector, it is easier to generalize than from single firm studies. 
The key variable of interest is the number of promotions. Respondents were asked to 
answer the following question:  “How many times have you been promoted within the Victorian public 
sector since you first joined?” Pergamit and Veum (1999) note that promotion can take many forms. 
Some promotions involve a position upgrade, some promotions involve no change of duties, 
while other promotions involve new functions and responsibilities. In the Census, the question 
relating to the number of promotions, gave the following definition of promotion to 
respondents: “Promotion is appointment to new position at a higher level which involves increased 
                                                 
14 We are grateful to the Victorian Office of Public Employment for making the data available to us.  
15 We are confident that this attrition in the sample does not bias the estimates. For example, by omitting some of 
the variables, we are able to increase the sample size with no real noticeable differences in the promotion responses. 
16 The Census did not include any useable information on indigenous status. 
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accountability, higher level technical skills and/or increased supervisory responsibility”. Hence, the data we 
have on promotions relates to what is normally thought of as career progression and 
advancement within the firm involving greater responsibility, rather than simple position 
reclassification. It means also that respondents have an explicit and specific definition of 
promotion. Some of the existing studies were forced to use existing data that had no explicit 
definition of promotion, but relied on a “common perception of what constitutes a promotion” 
(McCue 1996, p. 176).17  
It should be noted that while promotions are defined as placements involving greater 
responsibility, we do not have information on the extent of changes in responsibilities as a result 
of promotion. This is a situation that characterizes most of the extant studies on promotion. We 
also do not have information on whether promotion was contested, and how much competition 
there was for promotion. The other limitation with our data is that in common with many other 
studies, we have no information on quits. If the probability of promotion for employees who 
remain is different to those who leave, then this will limit the degree to which our results can be 
generalized. Following Wise (1975) we analyzed the correlations between tenure and the other 
covariates. Most of the correlations are very small, suggesting that this problem is likely to be 
small.18, 19 
 
3.1     Modeling Strategy 
In the case of analysis of pay differentials, there is a well-developed economic theory 
commencing with Mincer (1974) and Becker (1971 and 1975), specifying both the type of 
variables that should be included in an earnings regression, as well as the functional form (log-
linear). This is not the case for promotion. Existing investigations have relied on reduced form 
regressions and have been driven largely by data availability. In the absence of an accepted 
structural economic model of promotions, we follow the extant literature and explore the 
determinants of promotion by selecting a range of variables that have been identified in the 
literature as being important. 
Our approach involves estimating an ordered probit model that identifies the 
determinants of promotion in the Victorian Public Sector. This involves estimating various 
versions of the following equation: 
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ββββββββ 0
(1) 
 
where i indexes the ith public sector employee, H is a vector of human capital variables 
(including tenure), EEO for is a vector of Equal Employment Opportunity dummies, J is a 
vector of internal labor market characteristics, W is a vector of individual worker characteristics 
and S is a vector of sub-group (workplace) variables. Our primary interest lies in the EEO 
                                                 
17 Like the vast majority of other promotion studies, we rely on self-reporting of promotions and are unable to 
match respondents to their actual positions in the hierarchy. We have no information on the extent to which 
respondents overstate their career advancement. However, officers from the Victorian Office of Public 
Employment believe that the responses were a fair and accurate representation of career progression within the 
public sector. 
18 The highest correlation is between tenure and the performance of higher duties (0.28), sideways movements (0.26) 
and permanent status (0.20). 
19 Like all other studies, we also lack any information on demotions and, hence, are unable to model this aspect of 
internal labour markets. Demotions are likely to be an uncommon event in the markets we are analysing. Lateral 
moves, however, may be more common and these are included in our estimation. 
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dummies and the EEO interactive terms. Definitions of all the variables as well as descriptive 
statistics are listed in Appendix A. 
 
3.2     The Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is PROMOTIONS, which is the number of promotions since joining 
the VPSct, available as 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4+. The number of promotions is constrained to 4+ on the 
upper bound. While the underlying data generating process for “promotability” is a continuous 
latent one, PROMOTIONS is observed as integer values. Treating the PROMOTIONS 
variable as a continuous variable would result in the assumption that the difference between 1 
and 2 promotions is equivalent to the difference between 3 and 4+ promotions, which is clearly 
potentially misleading.  
We would like to capture the probability of an event occurring (promotion), given the 
row vector of individual characteristics, that is “promotability”. In this case, 2 promotions is 
superior to 1, and the relationship between 1 and 2 promotions is different than that between 3 
and 4+. Once the individual passes a certain unobserved promotability threshold in his/her 
career given his/her characteristics, promotion occurs. Further, this promotability is observed 
only when the actual promotions take place, which are ordinal in ranking. Given this, it is natural 
to use the ordered probit model. The only disadvantage of this approach is treating all 
individuals with 4+ promotions as being equally talented. However, this is imposed by the data 
availability. Further, given the similitude of the promotions at the upper levels, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the error associated with this assumption will be minimal. 
The multinomial logit model is not an appropriate choice for estimation, as this model 
does not incorporate the ordering of the data. Cameron and Trivedi (1998, p.87) note that the 
multinomial logit model is valid only in cases where: “the relative probabilities of any two 
outcomes are independent of the probabilities of other outcomes”. This is clearly not the case 
with respect to promotions.  
In some ways, the dependent variable resembles a censored variable; that is, it is 
restricted to 0 from below (and many zeroes in the sample) and has observations such as 4+, 
meaning that promotions above 4 are censored. This would suggest a Tobit estimation. 
However, the Tobit model could be used only if the dependent variable could be treated as 
“continuous”. Further, such censoring is intrinsic to the ordered probit dependent variables. 
A count data model may be an option, but there are certain problems in this case. For 
example, the Poisson distribution upon which this model is built makes strong assumptions, 
such as the probability of an occurrence is constant at any point in time and that the variance of 
the number of events is equal to the expected number of events. These assumptions are hard to 
justify in the context of promotion in public sector labor markets. Moreover, the increasingly 
popular Negative Binomial model (Negbin) is also not appropriate (see, for example, Garcia-
Crespo 2001).  Cameron and Trivedi (1998) note that the Poison and the Negbin models are not 
valid if the data generating process is deemed to be that of a continuous latent variable. Our 
focus is on promotability, which is a continuous latent variable. This makes the use of the Poison 
and Negbin models inappropriate.20 Hence, on theoretical grounds, we prefer the ordered probit 
model to count based models.21 
                                                 
20 Promotability is very different to obvious count based series such as patents, the number of children, the number 
of job changes and the  number of unemployment spells (see Winkelmann 2003). 
21 We also converted the dependent variable into a binary choice variable, taking the value of 1 for respondents who 
have received a promotion and 0 for those who did not. This was estimated using a binary probit model. Binary 
probit and logit models have been used extensively in this literature (see for example: Groot and van den Brink 
1996; Baldi and McBrier 1997; Elvira 2001; and Booth et al. 2003). An ordered probit models is a natural extension 
of a binary probit model when more information is available on one or two of the choices in the binary choice 
dependent variable (whether a promotion was received or not). It facilitates exploring different dimensions of the 
promotion question, incorporating the differences in the number of promotions.  
 
 11
Table 1 compares the percentage of males to females for each of the number of 
promotions. In the VPSct overall, a greater proportion of females has attained no promotions, 
and a smaller percentage of females attains 4 or more promotions. This pattern is confirmed in 
the multivariate analysis presented below. Table 1 compares also the distribution of promotions 
for employees with a disability to employees without a disability. Note that Table 1 presents the 
“raw” differences in promotion. In order to attribute these differences to bias in promotion, it is 
necessary to control for the impact of individual employee characteristics and productivity 
differences, as well as differences in jobs.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.3     Explanatory Variables 
We draw upon the extant literature and use explanatory variables that are designed to capture a 
range of individual, productivity, job and sub-sector characteristics. Ideally, we should include 
expected future performance, as this is an important aspect when workers are promoted. 
However, this is unobserved. Hence, we assume that past performance and observable worker 
characteristics are a sufficient proxy for future performance. 
 
EEO dummies: The first set of explanatory variables is a series of dummies for EEO status. These 
are dummies for gender (Female), disability (Disability)22, whether the respondent was born 
outside Australia in an English speaking country (Born OA English), and whether the 
respondent was born outside Australia in a non-English speaking country (Born OA non-
English).23 The distinction between English and non-English background is introduced to test 
whether cultural and linguistic differences play a role in promotion.  Our key focus in this paper, 
and most of the interpretation of the results, is on the association between EEO status and 
promotion.24 
Given the nature of public sector labor markets, we expect relatively little bias in 
promotion associated with EEO status. Officially, given the extent of legislation, there should be 
no bias against, or for, any of these groups. Hence, we expect that these coefficients should not 
be statistically significantly different from zero, once all other factors have been controlled for. 
Unofficially, however, bias can still arise in the promotions process. If promotion panels are biased 
towards a particular EEO group, it should be detectable in the data.  
 
Human Capital: It is customary to include variables that capture educational attainment. With 
regard to promotion, however, it is important to net out the contributions of human capital at 
the time of entry and the acquisition of additional human capital whilst employed in the public 
sector. Most existing studies do not control for the timing of qualifications and merely include 
the highest qualifications attained. For example, variables such as the highest level of education 
qualification attained at the time of entry into the public sector, represent the rewards to 
education from the external labor market. Workers are employed on the basis of actual and 
potential productivity and this is, at least, in part reflected in qualifications at time of entry. An 
argument can be made that it is reasonable to assume that qualifications held at the time of entry 
                                                 
22 The actual question relating to disability was: “Do you have any sort of disability that restricts you in performing 
everyday activities and which is long-term (lasting six months or more)?” Respondents were also given some 
examples of what constitutes a disability.  
23 There is a fairly large literature on the earnings of immigrants to Australia (see, for example, Chiswick, Lee and 
Miller (2005), but these studies do not consider the career progression of migrant workers. 
24 In unreported regressions, disability status was separated into disability at the time of entry and disability whilst 
employed at the VPSct. This does not lead to results that differ from using an aggregate disability measure. 
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translate into the level of initial appointment, a separate variable outlined below. This suggests 
that qualifications at the time of entry should not be used as a control variable. Thus, we 
construct a set of dummy variables that show qualifications attained while employed in the VPSct. 
This involves the following set of dummy variables: PhD Gained, Masters Gained, Bachelor 
Gained, Graduate Diploma Gained, Advanced Diploma Gained and Certificate Gained. 
These variables measure whether a respondent acquired a degree/diploma/certificate while 
employed in the VPSct. For example, the PhD Gained variable shows the returns to an existing 
employee from successfully pursuing further studies (in the form of a PhD), while employed in 
the VPSct. Such human capital acquisition can be expected to increase the prospects for 
promotion and, hence, the corresponding salary. Therefore, this variable represents the rewards 
to formal education that arise from internal labor markets. 
However, at least three arguments can also be made for including entry level 
qualifications. First, it is true that qualifications at the time of entry should be reflected in the 
initial appointment. However, this assumes an efficient job matching process and one that is free 
of discrimination. If discrimination does exist in promotion and pay, it could exist also in the 
initial job placement (see Olson and Becker 1983). Second, the inclusion of entry level 
qualifications also serves to capture the so-called ‘overeducation’ effects. Sicherman and Galor 
(1990) argue that promotion is an important part of the returns to education. According to their 
model, employees may accept positions for which they are overqualified if these positions will 
lead to faster promotion. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis has been found by Sicherman 
(1991), Robst (1995) and Hersch (1995), but not by Buchel and Mertens (2004). Third, there may 
exist unobserved worker characteristics and these may be correlated with entry level 
qualifications. Hence, the addition of entry level qualifications in the promotions equation has 
the effect of serving as a proxy for: (a) unobserved skills/abilities; (b) inefficiency in the 
sorting/matching of workers to jobs; (c) discrimination in the sorting/matching of workers to 
jobs; and (d) overeducation effects. 
After formal qualifications, length of service is the other important human capital 
variable. The variable Tenure serves as a proxy for job experience and on-the-job training. The 
tenure variable was constructed by calculating the number of years employed with the Public 
Sector, net of career breaks.25 The number of years worked was reduced by the number of years 
of a break in a career. This term is introduced also as a squared term. Tenure is also a proxy for 
seniority.  Those staff who have worked the longest are the more senior, even when they have 
not been promoted.26 Dolton and Kidd (1998) note that tenure need not reflect firm-specific 
human capital, but could merely be a proxy for the matching of jobs to workers. In practice, it is 
likely to be all three. Hence, we interpret the tenure variable to represent the net effect of 
seniority, firm specific skills, as well as the matching process.27  
One way to view age at entry is as a proxy for general human capital skills brought to the 
public sector from an entrant. Tenure, on the other hand, is a proxy for specific skills acquired 
whilst working in the public sector. Together, these two variables capture general and specific 
skills brought into the workplace and the coefficients on these two variables can be used to 
identify the impact of skills on promotions. 
                                                 
25 That is, tenure is not the total number of years of work experience. It is the number of years of work experience 
with the Public Sector. 
26 Abraham and Medoff (1985) argue that if a simple promotion equation is estimated and a positive coefficient on 
tenure revealed, then seniority is important in promotion. A negative coefficient indicates a merit based promotion 
process, although this is also consistent with discrimination against older employees. Following Abraham and 
Medoff (1985) we estimated also a simple version of the promotion process, involving only the tenure and tenure 
squared variables. In this case, the coefficient on tenure is +0.13 (z=44.56) and for tenure squared it is -0.002 (z=-
22.38), using a sample size of 18,001 observations.  
27 In our framework, we separate out age at entry and tenure with the public sector. An alternative approach would 
be to include a total experience variable that combines age and tenure (see Borjas 1978). 
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The positive association between tenure (in 5 year intervals) and the average number of 
promotions, and the noticeable gender differences in this association, are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Internal Labor Market Characteristics: We add controls for the level of initial appointment, by 
including three dummy variables, namely appointment at a middle level (VPSMID), a high level 
(VPSHIGH) and an executive level (VPSEXEC), with appointment at a low level (VPSLOW) 
as the base. It is to be expected that the promotions will be negatively associated with the level of 
initial appointment. We test also whether full-time workers (Full-time) are more likely to be 
promoted than part-time workers, as well as whether permanent workers (Permanent) have an 
advantage over casuals. Sidewayjob is a variable included to capture experience acquired within 
the internal labor market. This is the number of times an employee has moved to a new job at 
their current level within the VPSct. Higherduties is a variable that is included to capture 
experience at higher levels, and is constructed by counting the number of times an employee 
acted in a job at a higher level for a period of more than one month. Sidewayjob and 
Higherduties can be interpreted also as experience and, hence, human capital variables. 
 
Individual Characteristics: The final set of control variables are added to control for worker specific 
attributes, such as the worker’s age at the time of entry into the VPSct (Age Entry) and marital 
status (Married).  Career breaks include time off for family commitments, time off for study, 
and for other reasons. They affect earnings, and can even affect the gender wage gap (Spivey 
2005). Moreover, career breaks are especially relevant in the context of gender differences in 
promotion. Dolton and Kidd (1998) found that ‘time off’ had an adverse effect on careers. 
Hence, we include a separate variable for career breaks as a result of family commitments 
(Home Duties). This enables us to test whether taking time off from work for family 
commitment has a detrimental impact on promotion. The other individual characteristics added 
in the regressions are marital status, the number and the age of children, all of which reflect non-
market opportunities. 
 
Other variables: A key challenge for researchers is to separate productivity from discrimination in 
earnings and promotions. Unobserved worker characteristics and abilities will affect the results 
of any analysis. Our approach is to use a broad range of variables that proxy for productivity and 
ability differences, incentives to work and potential to perform greater responsibilities. In 
addition to these variables, we consider one additional proxy for abilities. The Census collected 
information on employer financial support for study. If we assume that this support is given to 
staff who are more able, then this variable can capture some of the unobserved differences in 
ability. For example, Dolton and Kidd (1998) found that training had a positive effect on the 
probability of promotion.28 
Our specification is general enough to capture most of the hypothesized determinants of 
promotion. One notable omission is unionization. The issue of union status and promotion has 
been explored in several papers (e.g. Abraham and Medoff 1985, Mills 1985, and Pergamit and 
Veum 1999). However, we do not have any information on union status and, hence, are unable 
to explore this dimension.  
           The Census data offers information on EEO status and industry of employment. Instead 
of running separate regression for different groups, we chose to pool the data and use dummy 
variables and dummy variables interacted with covariates to capture the associations of interest. 
The pooling of data in the analysis of gender and racial differences is recommended strongly by 
Jackson and Lindley (1989), Gaynor and Durben (1995), Booth et al. (2003), and Gupta et al. (2006). 
                                                 
28 There is of course an associated problem of the possibility of discrimination in training. We abstract from this 
issue and simply explore the impact of observed training support on promotion. 
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Table 2 provides a summary of the average values of some of the variables, for each of 
the EEO groups. On average, females were younger than males, occupied fewer executive 
positions, had fewer years of experience, were less likely to be in a full-time position and were 
less likely to possess a higher degree. Employees born outside Australia are more likely to 
possess a higher degree and those from an English speaking background are more likely to 
occupy executive positions. These employees however have fewer years experience within the 
Victorian public sector. As our analysis shows, these differences in endowments play a pivotal 
role in differences in promotions. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.     Results 
Several versions of equation 1 were estimated in order to explore the sensitivity of the 
results.29 The results are presented in Table 3. The results presented in column 1 are derived 
from including the EEO dummies, the five industry dummies (not included in the table) and the 
industry-EEO interactive terms (also unreported).30 The second set of results (column 2) 
includes controls for individual employee characteristics. Human capital terms are included in 
column 3 and internal labor market variables are included in column 4. The key results from 
estimating the full model (with all variables and interactive terms added) are reported in column 
5. In the process of generating the results presented in column 5, we do not control for any 
potential endogeneity in the qualifications variables. It is possible that unobserved worker 
specific characteristics drive the acquisition of new human capital skills. That is, workers with 
higher unobserved ability might be selected into the public service and these workers are also 
assisted to acquire additional human capital. This would have the effect of creating an upward 
bias in the estimates for the human capital skills acquired. One way to control for this effect is to 
include in the regressions human capital skills at the time of hiring. These are added as regressors 
in the results presented in column 6. The results presented in column 7 are our preferred 
specification. These results are derived by including employer support for training as an 
explanatory variable. The last row reports the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic, testing the 
hypothesis that all variables in the estimated equations have coefficients equal to zero. This 
hypothesis is rejected in all cases. Note that table 3 presents only some of the parameter 
estimates. The full set of coefficients for all the models including the interactive terms, are 
available from the authors (but two of the models – relating to columns 5 and 7 - are presented 
in Appendix A).  
With the exception of column 3, the coefficient for females is always negative and 
strongly statistically significant. The coefficient on disability becomes statistically insignificant 
once human capital or internal labor market variables are introduced. The coefficient for 
employees born overseas from an English speaking country is always negative and statistically 
significant. The coefficient for employees born overseas from a non-English speaking country 
becomes statistically insignificant once individual employee characteristics are controlled for. In 
the full set of results, we find no evidence of discrimination for these employees.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is difficult to make direct interpretations from the coefficients of an ordered probit 
model (see Greene 2000, p. 878). However, the coefficients from the full model (column 7) can 
be used to calculate the expected number of promotions for workers with specific 
                                                 
29 Eviews 5.1 was used for all the econometric analysis.  
30 Regressing the number of promotions on only the EEO dummies produces the following results: Female (-0.354, 
t=-20.76), Disability (-0.076, t=-2.07), Born OS English (-0.156, t=-5.12) and Born OS Non- English (-0.155, t=-
5.58). 
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characteristics, and they can be used to calculate the marginal impact of EEO status on the 
prospects of promotion.31  
 
4.1.     Decomposition 
A common approach in the economics of wage discrimination is the use of various 
decomposition techniques designed to identify the various compositions that make up raw 
differences in wages between different types of workers. These techniques typically decompose 
the raw wage differential into differences that can be attributed to productivity and those that 
can be attributed to discrimination. These techniques have been devised primarily for the analysis 
of wage differentials (see Oaxaca and Random 1994). While decomposition techniques can be 
used also to decompose promotion, they have only rarely been used to do so (for exceptions see 
Jones and Jackson 1992 and Garcia-Crespo 2001). 
          Our decomposition draws upon the approach of Garcia-Crespo (2001).32 First, we 
calculate the actual or observed differential in the actual Census data. These were reported in 
Table 1 and are repeated in column 1 of Table 4. Second, we use the estimated coefficients from 
the ordered probit model (reported in Table 2, column 7) to calculate the mean number of 
promotions for males, females, workers with a disability, workers without a disability, workers 
born overseas and workers not born overseas. These are presented in column 2 of Table 4. The 
third step involves decomposing the predicted number of promotions into those due to 
endowment differences and those due to a residual (which includes the underlying and 
incremental biases). Promotion differences due to discrimination are included as part of this 
residual. It should be noted that the decomposition involved calculating the endowment and 
residual effects by solving the promotions equation for each individual and then averaging the 
results.33 
The productivity effect (also known as the endowment effect) is calculated by comparing 
the number of promotions of males (using the coefficients for males) to the number of 
promotions for females (also using the coefficients for males).34 That is, we compare the number 
of promotions assuming that aspects such as human capital are rewarded equally across EEO 
groups. As Garcia-Crespo (2001, p. 610) notes, the underlying assumption is that: “in a world 
without discrimination regarding internal mobility opportunities, women would be treated in the 
same way as men and so we use the male coefficients … to evaluate the endowment differential 
by gender”. The differences in promotions due to endowment effects are reported in column 3, 
Table 4. 
The final column reports the residual. Interpreting the residual is complicated by the fact 
that it includes both discrimination as well as unobserved and unmeasured differences in abilities 
and expected future performance. Olson and Becker (1983, p. 628) note that the problem is: “… 
whether the residual difference reflects discrimination or average differences in unmeasured 
abilities between the groups that are not the result of the job-placement practices and training 
investments of firms.” 
                                                 
31 We present only the results for the public sector in general. Detailed sub-sector results are available from the 
authors. 
32 Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) point out that a major problem with decomposition techniques is that the 
contribution of individual groups of dummy variables to the unexplained portion of decomposition (from which 
discrimination is inferred) is not invariant to the choice of the reference group. However, our focus is on the overal 
decomposition, which Oaxaca and Random (1999) show is not affected by the choice of a reference group. 
Consequently, we do not attempt any of the recent suggested modifications (e.g. Gardeazabal and Ugidos 2004 and 
Yun 2005). Moreover, the invariance problem has been identified, and solutions devised, for estimations where the 
dependent variable is continuous (e.g. wage equations). This literature has not assessed the detailed decomposition 
of ordinal based estimations and, hence, we prefer to focus on the overal decomposition. 
33 An alternative approach is to use the average values and solve the equations for this. That is, instead of evaluating 
at the mean of the sample, we follow Garcia-Crespo (2001) and evaluate for all individuals using the observed 
distribution of endowments.  
34 There is little difference to the results if females are used as the benchmark. 
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As can be seen from Table 4, the ordered probit model generates predicted differences in 
promotions that are strikingly similar to the observed differences, although it does marginally 
understate the promotion differences for workers born overseas in a non-English speaking 
country.35 The largest observed differences in promotions are associated with gender. The 
important point, however, is that the endowment effect suggests that most (85 percent) of the 
gender difference in promotions can be explained by differences in endowments.36 All of the 
differences in the number of promotions for workers with disability is due to differences in 
endowments.37 Indeed, the residual component for employees with a disability is a small positive 
number. That is, if workers with a disability had the same endowments as able-bodied workers, 
they would receive slightly more promotions. Virtually all (91 percent) of the promotion 
differential for workers born overseas from an English speaking country is due to the 
endowment effect. In contrast to this, the endowment effect for workers born overseas from a 
non-English speaking county exceeds the predicted differential. As in the case of workers with a 
disability, the results indicate a positive residual in favor of these workers. However, as already 
noted, only the gender promotion differential is of clear economic significance. The residual 
column suggests that there is in effect minimal discrimination in promotion in Victorian public 
sector labor markets, once endowment effects are controlled for. We conclude that promotion in 
the VPSct is driven mainly by factors relating to work performance and work experience rather 
than EEO status, and that the processes of promotion in the VPSct are in net terms effectively 
free of bias. 
While there are numerous studies on promotion, there exist only a handful of studies 
that have applied decomposition techniques to promotions. Hence, comparisons with other 
studies are necessarily limited. However, our results are qualitative similar to those found by 
other researchers, although the proportion attributable to endowments is significantly greater in 
our sample. For example, Garcia-Crespo (2001) found that the observed gender differential in 
Spain was 0.419, of which 0.271 (or 66 percent) was due to endowments. For their sample of 
college of business graduates, Jones and Jackson (1992) found that the endowment effect 
accounted for only 31 percent of the differential. In sharp contrast, Booth et al. (2003) found no 
gender differences in promotions for the U.K.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2      Marginal Effects 
For the sake of brevity we discuss only some of the marginal effects, and because promotion 
differences are more pronounced for gender, we focus mainly on the associations between 
promotion, human capital and gender.38, 39 In this regard, two sets of impacts merit discussion. 
First, we are interested in the incremental gender bias, measured as the marginal effect of human 
capital on promotion for males minus the marginal effect of human capital on promotion for 
females. Second, we are interested in the incremental timing biases in the returns to human 
                                                 
35 Given the number of dimensions which the model is covering, it is not surprising that it may do better at 
predicting some dimensions than others. Note that the forecasting ability of the model is fairly robust to changes to 
the sample size.  
36 The broader question of what causes the endowment differences – some of which are reported in Table 2 – is 
beyond the scope of this paper and cannot be addressed by our dataset. If we take the endowment differences to be 
strictly exogenous to the firm, then the differences will arise from individual choice and pre-labor market 
discrimination. 
37 The endowment effect is here calculated by using the coefficients for abled-bodied employees. 
38 Note that the marginal effects are not detailed decomposition effects and, hence, are not affected by the choice of 
reference group. The full set of marginal effects is available from the authors.  
39 The text presents only marginal effects relating to the expected number of promotions. Details on the 
probabilities of receiving 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 promotions are available from the authors. 
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capital, measured as the marginal effect of entry level qualification on promotion minus the 
marginal effect of qualifications gained on promotion. 
The impact of acquiring formal qualifications on promotion is highlighted in Table 5, 
which reports the marginal impact (marginal effects) of formal education, classified by gender, 
both at the time of entry and those acquired during tenure.40 All the marginal effects from 
qualifications acquired are positive.41 The successful completion of a PhD, a Masters or a 
Bachelors degree after joining the VPSct increases the expected number of promotions for all 
employees, with the highest increase in the probability of promotion for female employees who 
complete a PhD qualification. Gaining formal qualifications increases the prospects of 
promotion, facilitating career progression within the VPSct internal labor markets, and 
consequently contributing to salary growth. The third row reports the incremental gender biases. 
In all cases, the incremental bias favors females; males can expect fewer promotions from 
gaining qualifications than equivalent females with equivalent qualifications.  
Qualifications at the time of entry are also important to promotion. 42 That is, 
qualifications at the time of entry do no determine just the level of initial appointment, but also 
the subsequent career path.43 Earlier, we presented three theoretical reasons for including 
qualifications at time of entry into the public sector: (a) bias in the initial placement; (b) a proxy 
for unobserved skills/abilities; and (c) overeducation effects. Unless all employees with 
qualifications are discriminated against, the results presented in Table 5 are inconsistent with 
discrimination at the time of entry hypothesis. The results are, however, consistent with the 
existence of inefficiency at the initial point of recruitment. The results are consistent also with 
both the overeducation hypothesis and the existence of unobservable attributes.44 Employees 
with qualifications may be more productive and, hence, are rewarded by a greater number of 
promotions.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Comparing the returns at entry to those during tenure with the VPSct, it is clear that in all cases 
more promotions can be expected from acquiring a qualification than at the time of entry.45 
Table 6 presents some of the other marginal effects. Both tenure variables are statistically 
significant in the ordered probit regressions. The negative sign on the tenure squared term 
indicate that promotion prospects increase with tenure, but do so at a decreasing rate. Table 6 
shows that tenure is incrementally biased against females. Furthermore, the incremental bias 
against females arising from tenure widens over time (this result can be seen also in Figure 1).  
On average, full-time employees are more likely to be promoted than employees working 
part-time. To the extent that full-time employment reflects individual choices, and full-time 
                                                 
40 The ordered probit model conveniently provides, based on the row vector of characteristics, X, the expected 
number of promotions for each individual i with the following formula: jjyoby i
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predicted number of promotions, j=0. 1. 2.....J-1 and J is the number of choices, and )(Pr jyob i = is the probability 
of choice j occuring. For details on the derivation of these probabilities, see Greene (2000, pp. 876-8).  
41 Similar findings on the benefits of education have been established by other researchers (see, for example, Wise 
1975 and Montgomery and Powell 2003). 
42 Note that the marginal effects are calculated by comparing individuals with and without the associated degrees. 
Hence, for Masters at Entry, we compare individuals whose highest qualifications was a masters at the time of entry 
to individuals whose highest qualification was a Bachelor degree. 
43 However, while there is effectively no difference in the gender returns to a Bachelor degree at the time of entry in 
terms of expected promotions (the incremental bias is only +0.01), females can expect slightly fewer promotions 
from possessing a PhD. 
44 Both of these are observationally equivalent. 
45 This does not, however, mean that workers earn more from qualifications acquired than qualifications at the time 
of entry. 
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workers are more productive than part-time staff, this is not bias. Rather it reflects the 
consequence of an effective endowment. However, the marginal effects show that males gain 
more than females from full-time status, and this is an example of an incremental bias against 
females. 
Employees who are appointed at an executive level can expect fewer subsequent 
promotions. Males appointed to an executive level position face an even lower probability of 
additional promotion than females do (when compared to people of the same gender who hold 
low level positions in the system). 46 
Hence, we conclude that while there is relatively little discrimination in Victorian public 
sector labor markets, there do exist incremental biases against women (principally arising from 
full-time status and tenure), and there exist also incremental biases in favor of women (mainly 
those associated with formal qualifications). 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
5.     Summary 
The allocation and pricing of resources are fundamental themes in economics. 
Organizations working in public sector labor markets rely recurrently on internal labor markets 
to allocate and price resources. The aim of this paper was to explore promotion within the 
Victorian Public Sector in Australia, using the cross-sectional 2004 Census. The analysis of the 
raw data on rates of promotion for this sample shows that while the differences in promotions 
for most EEO groups were small and of little economic significance, the raw data do show that, 
on average, women received fewer promotions than men. However, the multivariate analysis 
used here reveals that when one controls for human capital factors, individual characteristics and 
internal labor market characteristics, a different picture emerges. The results show that the main 
drivers of promotion for all EEO groups – even in the presence of gender differences - are 
differences in measured human capital, rather than discrimination in the promotion processes. In 
particular, formal education qualifications and job tenure are the dominant determinants. 
Differences in promotions due to factors other than endowments which could be attributed to 
discrimination are relatively small.  
Our overall conclusion from this study is that promotion in the Victorian Public Sector, 
at least over this period, is driven mainly by factors relating to work performance and work 
experience rather than attitudes of management and fellow workers to different EEO groups. 
The results are consistent with a public sector that, in response to a combination of changing 
community attitudes and regulatory requirements, is effectively free of any substantial net bias in 
promotions. Nevertheless, potentially important incremental biases were detected. Hence, while 
it is true that on average there is no net discrimination in the promotion process, it is possible to 
identify groups of employees whose career progression is not rewarded equally. Particularly 
noteworthy in this regard is the greater returns to females from the acquisition of higher formal 
qualifications and the greater returns to males from full-time work and from tenure.  
These findings suggest that the research reported in this paper can be extended profitably 
in several directions. First, analyzing the sources of the incremental biases with respect to tenure 
and formal qualifications is an important line of future research. Second, the results are 
suggestive of some degree of inefficiency in the recruitment process, with subsequent attempts 
to redress this through the promotions process. This inefficiency also warrants further 
investigation. Third, the Census did not offer any usable information on indigenous employees. 
                                                 
46 Some other interesting marginal effects include: age of entry into the VPSct is negatively correlated with 
promotion prospects, with older workers less likely to be promoted; taking time off from employment to nurture 
children and the number of children have no effect, and certainly have no detrimental effect on promotion 
prospects.  
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Hence, it was not possible to investigate career progression and pay equity issues relating to this 
important EEO group. Fourth, the specification of our model does not pick up any pre-
employment bias, which itself will understate the extent of disadvantage faced by females. 
Finally, our data is cross-sectional and exclusively focused on the public sector. Comparisons 
with earlier time periods and with the private sector would also be important extensions for 
future research. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Promotions, Males and Females, Victorian Public Sector 
Number of 
promotions 
Percentage of  
males 
Percentage of 
females 
With 
Disability  
Born OA 
English 
speaking 
Born OA 
non-
English 
speaking  
Without 
disability 
0 38% 48% 44% 49% 49% 45% 
1 19% 23% 22% 20% 22% 21% 
2 14% 14% 14% 15% 12% 14% 
3 10% 8% 7% 7% 8% 9% 
4 + 18% 7% 10% 9% 9% 11% 
Cell entries show the percentage of employees receiving a particular number of promotions. OA: Outside Australia 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Sample Averages of Selected Variables  
Variable Males  Female Disabled  
Born OA 
English 
speaking  
Born OA non-
English 
speaking  
Age 45.5  41.5  46.4 46.7 44.6 
Executive (%) 1.8%  0.5%  0.07% 2.1% 1.7% 
Years 
Experience 
 
14.9  10.9  14.3 11.4 11.5 
Full-time 90%  65%  70% 75% 80% 
Masters or 
PhD 
 
12.2%  8.6% 9.6% 14.6% 18.6% 
Number of 
observations 
7,210 12,259 1,025 1,523 1,837 
OA: Outside Australia 
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Table 3: EEO Status and Promotions, Ordered Probit Regressions, Key Coefficients  
[Dependent Variable = Number of Promotions] 
Variable Basic 
(1) 
Individual 
(2) 
Human 
capital 
(3) 
 
Internal 
labor 
market 
(4) 
(1)-(4) 
Combined 
(5) 
Full 
model, 
with entry 
level 
human 
capital 
(6) 
Full 
model, 
with 
employer 
assisted 
training 
(7) 
EEO Status 
Female -0.353 
(-14.64)*** 
-0.752 
(-9.86)*** 
0.041 
(0.89) 
-0.365 
(-4.76)*** 
-0.354 
(-2.87)*** 
-0.358 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.356 
(-2.74)*** 
Disability -0.128 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.308 
(-2.05)*** 
-0.058 
(-0.54) 
 
0.073 
(0.58) 
0.110 
(0.46) 
0.092 
(0.37) 
0.098 
(0.39) 
Born OA   
     English  
-0.191 
(-4.47)*** 
-0.154 
(-1.06) 
-0.167 
(-2.07)** 
-0.248 
(-2.25)** 
-0.554 
(-2.64)** 
-0.605 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.606 
(-2.74)*** 
Born OA   
     Non-   
     English 
-0.127 
(-3.34)*** 
 
0.017 
(0.14) 
-0.007 
(-0.94) 
-0.094 
(-2.43)** 
0.107 
(0.69) 
-0.018 
(-0.11) 
-0.010 
(-0.06) 
Individual Characteristics 
Age Entry - -0.043 (-26.43)*** - - 
-0.019 
(-9.98)*** 
-0.017 
(-8.71)*** 
-0.017 
 (-8.59)*** 
Married - 0.109 (4.21)*** - - 
0.116 
(4.30)*** 
0.105 
(3.86)*** 
0.103 
(3.81)*** 
Home 
    Duties 
- 0.006 (1.45) - - 
-0.006 
(-1.30) 
-0.005 
(-1.12) 
-0.005  
(-1.14) 
Number 
Children 
- 0.119 (10.98)*** - - 
-0.012 
(-0.90) 
0.000  
(0.23) 
0.002  
(0.19) 
Human Capital 
Tenure - - 0.126 
 (29.94)*** 
- 0.121 
(24.03)*** 
0.127 
(24.67)*** 
0.127 
(24.68)*** 
Tenure  
     squared 
- - -0.002  
(-17.56)*** 
- -0.003  
(-16.10)*** 
-0.003  
(-16.29)*** 
-0.003 
(-16.21)*** 
PhD 
Gained 
- - 0.696 
(5.45)*** 
- 0.737 
(5.42)*** 
0.577 
(4.21)*** 
0.580 
(4.23)*** 
Masters 
     Gained 
- - 0.624 
(11.03)*** 
- 0.600 
(10.40)*** 
0.510 
(8.59)*** 
0.515 
(8.70)*** 
Bachelor 
     Gained 
- - 0.372 
(7.18)*** 
- 0.336 
(6.10)*** 
0.429 
 (7.56)*** 
0.435 
 (7.67)*** 
Graduate     
Diploma  
     Gained 
- - 0.501 
(12.41)*** 
- 0.481 
(11.57)*** 
0.435 
(10.16)*** 
0.437 
(10.19)*** 
Advanced 
   Diploma 
     Gained 
- - 0.290  
(5.11)*** 
- 0.226 
(3.79)*** 
0.344 
(5.59)*** 
0.351 
(5.71)*** 
Certificate 
    Gained 
- - -0.034  
(-0.65) 
- -0.022 
 (-0.39) 
0.072  
(1.22) 
0.075 
 (1.26) 
Study - - 0.096  
(3.10)*** 
- 0.045  
(1.41) 
0.051  
(1.56) 
-0.077 
 (-1.55) 
PhD Entry - - - - - 0.174  
(1.00) 
0.171 
 (0.98) 
Masters 
     Entry 
- - - - - 0.230 
(2.79)*** 
0.231 
(2.80)*** 
Bachelor 
     Entry 
- - - - - 0.336 
(9.81)*** 
0.337 
(9.82)*** 
Graduate     
Diploma  
     Entry 
- - - - - 0.095 (1.99)* 0.099 
(2.07)** 
Advanced     
Diploma 
     Entry 
- - - - - 0.016 
 (0.33) 
0.018  
(0.37) 
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Table 3: EEO Status and Promotions, Ordered Probit Regressions, Key Coefficients 
[Dependent Variable = Number of Promotions]- continued 
Certificate 
Entry 
- - - - - -0.108  
(-2.49)** 
-0.108 
(-2.49)** 
Study 
Financial 
Support  
- - - - - - 0.222 
(3.73)*** 
Internal Labor Market Characteristics 
Full-Time - - - 0.248 
(9.86)*** 
0.359 
(12.33)*** 
0.366 
(12.46)*** 
0.358 
(12.18)*** 
Permanent - - - 0.426 
(12.16) 
*** 
0.123 
(3.26)*** 
0.132 
(3.48)*** 
0.123 
(3.24)*** 
VPSExec - - - -0.987 
 (-5.33*** 
-0.865  
(-3.98)*** 
-0.927  
(-4.07)*** 
-0.943  
(-4.15)**** 
VPSHigh - - - -0.591 
 (-8.96)*** 
-0.356  
(-4.73)*** 
-0.421  
(-5.55)*** 
-0.420 
 (-5.53)*** 
VPSMid - - - -0.168  
(-6.62)*** 
-0.049  
(-1.71)* 
-0.086  
(-2.93)*** 
-0.089  
(-2.96)*** 
Sidewayjo
b 
- - - 0.106 
(14.29)*** 
0.041 
(6.04)*** 
0.039 
(5.85)*** 
0.040 
(5.87)*** 
Higherdut
ies 
- - - 0.065 
(9.84)*** 
0.043 
(7.83)*** 
0.043 
(7.81)*** 
0.044 
(7.81)*** 
Sample 
Size 
18,459 17,130 17,531 18,063 16,775 16,675 16,675 
LR 
Statistic  
3284*** 3284*** 6676*** 3676*** 7848*** 8110*** 8135*** 
*, **, ***, statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics in brackets, using robust standard errors. 
 
 
Table 4: Endowments and Discrimination  
 Observed 
Differential 
(1) 
Predicted 
Differential 
(2) 
Due to 
Productivity 
(Endowment 
Effect) 
(3) 
Residual 
(includes 
discrimination)† 
(4) 
Females Compared to 
Males 
 
-0.46 -0.43 -0.36 -0.06 
Workers with a 
Disability Compared 
to Able-Bodied 
Workers  
 
-0.06 -0.07 -0.08 +0.01 
Workers Born 
Outside Australia 
(English Speaking) 
Compared to Workers 
Born in Australia 
 
-0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.01 
Workers Born 
Outside Australia 
(Non-English 
Speaking) Compared 
to Workers Born in 
Australia 
 
-0.17 -0.10 -0.18 +0.08 
† A negative (positive) residual is consistent with bias against (in favor of). 
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Table 5: Incremental Impact of Gender on the Promotion Effects of Acquiring 
Formal Qualifications  
 Gaining a 
PhD 
Gaining a 
Masters 
Gaining a 
Bachelor 
PhD at 
Entry 
Masters at 
Entry 
Bachelor at 
Entry 
Expected 
Number of 
Additional 
Promotions 
– Males 
 
+0.19 +0.33 +0.31 +0.34 +0.15 +0.16 
Expected 
Number of 
Additional 
Promotions 
– Females 
 
+0.46 +0.38 +0.38 +0.27 +0.18 +0.17 
Incremental 
bias against 
women†† 
+0.27 +0.05 +0.07 -0.07 +0.03 +0.01 
†† A positive (negative) sign indicates that the marginal effect of a qualification is higher (lower) for females than it 
is for males. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Incremental Impact of Gender on the Promotion Effects of Selected 
Internal Labor Market and Individual Characteristics 
 Study 
Assistance 
Married Full-
Time 
Ongoing Executive Higher 
Duties 
Tenure 
(10 to 15)  
Tenure 
(10 to 20)
Expected 
Number of 
Additional 
Promotions – 
Males 
+0.18 +0.12 +0.38 -0.18 -0.57 +0.03 +0.37 +0.67 
Expected 
Number of 
Additional 
Promotions - 
Females 
+0.16 +0.08 +0.26 +0.09 -0.53 +0.03 +0.27 +0.43 
Incremental 
bias against 
women† 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.12 +0.27 -0.04 0 -0.10 -0.24 
† A positive (negative) sign indicates that the marginal effect of a qualification is higher (lower) for females than it is 
for males. 
 28
Figure 1: Tenure and Average Number of Promotions 
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Appendix A: Definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Base 
(for 
dummies) 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Variable Description Base 
(for 
dummies) 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Dependent variable  
Promotions The Number 
of 
Promotions 
since joining 
the Public 
Sector 
na 1.20 (1.38)     
Human Capital and Experience 
PhD 
Gained 
Gained a 
Doctoral 
Degree since 
joining VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.01 (0.10) Masters 
Gained 
Gained a 
Masters 
Degree since 
joining VPS 
 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.05 (0.21) 
Grad 
Diploma 
Gained 
Gained a 
Graduate 
Diploma 
since joining 
VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.09 (0.29) Bachelor 
Gained 
Gained a 
Bachelor 
Degree since 
joining VPS 
 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.05 (0.23) 
Adv 
Diploma 
Gained 
Gained an 
Advanced 
Diploma 
since joining 
VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.05 (0.22) Certificate 
Gained 
Gained a 
Certificate 
since joining 
VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.05 (0.23) 
PhD 
Entry 
Had a 
Doctoral 
Degree at 
time of 
joining VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.01 (0.11) Masters 
Entry 
Had a 
Masters 
Degree at 
time of 
joining VPS 
 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.03 (0.18) 
Grad 
Diploma 
Entry 
Had a 
Graduate 
Diploma at 
time of 
joining VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.09 (0.29) Bachelor 
Entry 
Had a 
Bachelor 
Degree at 
time of 
joining VPS 
 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.27 (0.44) 
Adv 
Diploma 
Entry 
Had an 
Advanced 
Diploma at 
time of 
joining VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.09 (0.29) Certificate 
Entry 
Had a 
Certificate at 
time of 
joining VPS 
Did not gain 
any formal 
qualifications 
since joining 
VPS 
0.14 (0.35) 
Study Respondent 
currently 
undertaking 
formal 
education 
Not 
undertaking 
formal 
education 
0.17 (0.38) Tenure Number of 
Years 
employed in 
the Public 
Sector 
na 12.42 (9.98) 
Study Assist 
Financial 
Respondent 
received 
financial 
assistance for 
study and 
training  
Respondent 
did not 
receive 
financial 
assistance for 
study and 
training 
0.09 (0.29)     
Individual Characteristics 
Genfemale Respondent is 
a female  
Respondent 
is a male 
0.37 (0.48) Disability Respondent 
has a 
disability 
Respondent 
does not 
have a 
disability 
0.05 (0.22) 
Born 
Outside 
Australia – 
English  
Respondent is 
born outside 
Australia 
from an 
English 
Respondent 
was born in 
Australia 
0.08 (0.27) Born 
Outside 
Australia – 
non-
English  
Respondent is 
born outside 
Australia 
from a non-
English 
Respondent 
was born in 
Australia 
0.10 (0.29) 
 30
speaking 
country  
speaking 
country 
Children Number of 
Children 
na 1.48 (1.39) Married Currently 
married 
Not married 0.67 (0.47) 
Age Entry Age at time 
of entry into 
VPS 
na 30.55 (9.50) Time off 
Family 
Total time 
away from 
work for 
family reasons
na 1.11 (3.04) 
Internal Labour Markets 
VPSMID First VPS job 
was a mid-
level job  
Entry level 
job 
0.24 (0.42) VPSHIGH First VPS job 
was a high-
level job 
 
Entry level 
job 
0.04 (0.21) 
VPSEXEC First VPS job 
was an 
executive 
level job 
 
Entry level 
job 
0.01 (0.10) SIDEWAY
SJOB 
How many 
times have 
you moved to 
a new job at 
your current 
level within 
the VPS  
 
Na 1.16 (1.94) 
Full-Time Respondent 
works full-
time 
Respondent 
works part-
time 
0.75 (0.44) Ongoing  Respondent 
has an 
ongoing or 
permanent 
position 
Respondent 
does not 
have an 
ongoing or 
permanent 
position 
0.83 (0.37) 
Higher 
Duties 
Number of 
times acted in 
a job at a 
higher level 
for a period 
of more than 
one month  
 
na 1.92 (4.24)     
Sector 
Water Respondent 
employed in 
Water  sub-
group  
Respondent 
employed in 
Victorian 
Public 
Service 
0.03 (0.17) Schools Respondent 
employed in 
Schools  sub-
group  
Respondent 
employed in 
Victorian 
Public 
Service 
0.03 (0.16) 
Health Respondent 
employed in 
Health  sub-
group  
Respondent 
employed in 
Victorian 
Public 
Service 
0.19 (0.39) Uni Respondent 
employed in 
Uni/TAFE  
sub-group  
Respondent 
employed in 
Victorian 
Public 
Service 
0.15 (0.35) 
Other  Respondent 
employed in 
Other  sub-
group  
Respondent 
employed in 
Victorian 
Public 
Service 
0.10 (0.30)     
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Appendix B:   Ordered Probit Regression Coefficients (Robust Covariances) 
Variable 
Coefficient 
z-
Statistic
Prob. Coefficient z-Statistic Prob. 
Female -0.354 -2.87 0.00 -0.356 -2.74 0.01 
Water -0.301 -3.12 0.00 -0.261 -2.71 0.01 
Health -0.188 -5.77 0.00 -0.176 -5.39 0.00 
Schools -0.066 -0.93 0.35 -0.095 -1.29 0.20 
Other -0.025 -0.50 0.62 -0.019 -0.37 0.71 
Uni -0.106 -2.76 0.01 -0.097 -2.45 0.01 
Female*Water -0.068 -0.59 0.55 -0.052 -0.45 0.65 
Female*Health -0.045 -0.69 0.49 -0.014 -0.21 0.83 
Female*Schools -0.014 -0.12 0.91 -0.012 -0.10 0.92 
Female*Other 0.091 1.43 0.15 0.062 0.97 0.33 
Female*Uni 0.089 1.52 0.13 0.065 1.08 0.28 
Disability 0.110 0.46 0.64 0.098 0.39 0.70 
BornOAEnglish -0.554 -2.64 0.01 -0.606 -2.74 0.01 
BornOAnonEnglish 0.107 0.69 0.49 -0.010 -0.06 0.95 
Disability*Water 0.220 0.80 0.42 0.232 0.82 0.41 
BornOAEnglish*Water 0.233 0.77 0.44 0.277 0.91 0.36 
BornOAnonEnglish*Water 0.096 0.32 0.75 0.008 0.03 0.98 
Disability*Health 0.188 1.42 0.16 0.163 1.21 0.22 
BornOAEnglish*Health 0.206 2.25 0.02 0.207 2.24 0.03 
BornOAnonEnglish*Health 0.095 1.09 0.28 0.052 0.59 0.56 
Disability*Uni 0.140 1.13 0.26 0.097 0.77 0.44 
BornOAEnglish*Uni 0.015 0.16 0.87 -0.030 -0.31 0.75 
BornOAnonEnglish*Uni 0.022 0.25 0.81 -0.036 -0.39 0.69 
Disability*Schools -0.267 -0.79 0.43 -0.354 -1.05 0.29 
BornOAEnglish*Schools -0.250 -0.88 0.38 -0.156 -0.56 0.58 
BornOAnonEnglish*Schools -0.241 -0.61 0.54 -0.219 -0.59 0.55 
Disability*Other 0.249 1.80 0.07 0.263 1.91 0.06 
BornOAEnglish*Other -0.083 -0.63 0.53 -0.104 -0.78 0.44 
BornOAnonEnglish*Other -0.223 -1.79 0.07 -0.208 -1.67 0.09 
Vpsmid -0.049 -1.71 0.09 -0.087 -2.96 0.00 
Vpshigh -0.356 -4.73 0.00 -0.420 -5.53 0.00 
Vpsexec -0.865 -3.98 0.00 -0.943 -4.15 0.00 
Higherduties 0.043 7.83 0.00 0.044 7.81 0.00 
Sidewaysjob 0.041 6.04 0.00 0.040 5.87 0.00 
Ftpt 0.359 12.33 0.00 0.358 12.18 0.00 
Ongoing 0.123 3.26 0.00 0.123 3.24 0.00 
Vpsmid*Female 0.146 3.15 0.00 0.141 2.97 0.00 
Vpshigh*Female 0.244 2.35 0.02 0.246 2.31 0.02 
Vpsexec*Female -0.196 -0.77 0.44 -0.179 -0.68 0.49 
Higherduties*Female 0.012 1.84 0.07 0.010 1.53 0.13 
Sidewaysjob*Female 0.008 0.73 0.47 0.007 0.61 0.54 
Ftpt*Female -0.115 -1.69 0.09 -0.110 -1.60 0.11 
Ongoing*Female 0.351 5.79 0.00 0.335 5.47 0.00 
Vpsmid*Disability 0.058 0.56 0.58 0.028 0.26 0.80 
Vpshigh*Disability 0.315 1.11 0.27 0.254 0.88 0.38 
Vpsexec*Disability -0.338 -0.48 0.63 -0.257 -0.34 0.73 
Higherduties*Disability -0.016 -2.08 0.04 -0.017 -2.22 0.03 
Sidewaysjob*Disability 0.051 2.26 0.02 0.050 2.18 0.03 
Ftpt*Disability -0.072 -0.66 0.51 -0.079 -0.72 0.47 
Ongoing*Disability -0.179 -1.38 0.17 -0.151 -1.15 0.25 
Vpsmid*BornOAEnglish -0.002 -0.03 0.98 0.002 0.03 0.98 
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Vpshigh*BornOAEnglish 0.359 2.29 0.02 0.375 2.32 0.02 
Vpsexec*BornOAEnglish 0.284 1.00 0.32 0.259 0.88 0.38 
Higherduties*BornOAEnglish 0.003 0.31 0.76 0.002 0.19 0.85 
Sidewaysjob*BornOAEnglish 0.022 1.05 0.30 0.020 0.99 0.32 
Ftpt*BornOAEnglish 0.162 1.81 0.07 0.149 1.67 0.10 
Ongoing*BornOAEnglish 0.036 0.37 0.72 0.048 0.48 0.63 
Ageentry -0.019 -9.98 0.00 -0.017 -8.59 0.00 
Married 0.116 4.30 0.00 0.103 3.81 0.00 
Timeofffamily -0.006 -1.30 0.20 -0.005 -1.14 0.25 
Nochildren -0.012 -0.90 0.37 0.002 0.19 0.85 
Ageentry*Female 0.003 0.91 0.36 0.002 0.65 0.52 
Married*Female -0.029 -0.62 0.53 -0.025 -0.54 0.59 
Timeofffamily*Female -0.046 -1.63 0.10 -0.045 -1.58 0.11 
Nochildren*Female 0.007 0.38 0.70 0.008 0.44 0.66 
Ageentry*Disability 0.001 0.12 0.90 -0.002 -0.35 0.73 
Married*Disability 0.019 0.20 0.84 0.045 0.46 0.64 
Timeofffamily*Disability 0.009 1.09 0.27 0.010 1.12 0.26 
Nochildren*Disability 0.045 1.27 0.20 0.044 1.23 0.22 
Ageentry*BornOAEnglish 0.009 1.83 0.07 0.009 1.91 0.06 
Married*BornOAEnglish 0.064 0.82 0.41 0.064 0.82 0.41 
Timeofffamily*BornOAEnglish 0.011 0.88 0.38 0.010 0.82 0.41 
Nochildren*BornOAEnglish -0.046 -1.53 0.13 -0.048 -1.59 0.11 
Ageentry*BornOAnonEnglish -0.006 -1.37 0.17 -0.008 -1.70 0.09 
Married*BornOAnonEnglish 0.044 0.57 0.57 0.018 0.23 0.82 
Timeofffamily*BornOAnonEnglish -0.009 -0.60 0.55 -0.005 -0.34 0.73 
Nochildren*BornOAnonEnglish 0.003 0.10 0.92 0.002 0.07 0.95 
Ephdgained 0.737 5.42 0.00 0.580 4.23 0.00 
Emastersgained 0.600 10.40 0.00 0.515 8.70 0.00 
Ebachelorgained 0.336 6.10 0.00 0.435 7.67 0.00 
Egraddiplomagained 0.481 11.57 0.00 0.437 10.19 0.00 
Eadvdiplomagained 0.226 3.79 0.00 0.351 5.71 0.00 
Ecertificategained -0.022 -0.39 0.70 0.075 1.26 0.21 
Female*Ephdgained 0.354 -2.11 0.04 0.365 -2.13 0.03 
Female*Emastersgained 0.079 -0.91 0.36 0.094 -1.06 0.29 
Female*Ebachelorgained -0.067 0.83 0.41 -0.043 0.51 0.61 
Female*Egraddiplomagained 0.151 -2.28 0.02 0.127 -1.88 0.06 
Female*Ecertificategained 0.026 -0.31 0.76 0.063 -0.71 0.48 
Female*Eadvdiplomagained 0.246 -2.89 0.00 0.260 -2.96 0.00 
Study 0.045 1.41 0.16 -0.077 -1.55 0.12 
Female*Study 0.052 -1.02 0.31 0.043 -0.54 0.59 
Disability*Ephdgained 0.311 0.83 0.40 0.298 0.77 0.44 
Disability*Emastersgained 0.053 0.25 0.80 0.008 0.04 0.97 
Disability*Ebachelorgained 0.117 0.68 0.50 0.118 0.65 0.51 
Disability*Egraddiplomagained 0.409 2.71 0.01 0.388 2.51 0.01 
Disability*Ecertificategained 0.115 0.68 0.50 0.138 0.78 0.44 
Disability*Eadvdiplomagained -0.262 -1.48 0.14 -0.249 -1.39 0.17 
BornOAEnglish*Ephdgained -0.232 -1.09 0.28 -0.192 -0.89 0.38 
BornOAEnglish*Emastersgained 0.107 0.74 0.46 0.137 0.93 0.35 
BornOAEnglish*Ebachelorgained -0.335 -2.12 0.03 -0.333 -2.07 0.04 
BornOAEngl*Egraddiplomagained -0.177 -1.49 0.14 -0.197 -1.63 0.10 
BornOAEnglish*Ecertificategained 0.029 0.13 0.90 0.031 0.13 0.89 
BornOAEngl*Eadvdiplomagained 0.120 0.74 0.46 0.107 0.65 0.52 
BornOAnonEnglish*Ephdgained -0.036 -0.14 0.89 0.102 0.37 0.71 
BornOAnonEngl*Emastersgained -0.328 -2.55 0.01 -0.260 -1.98 0.05 
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BornOAnonEngl*Ebachelorgained -0.117 -0.88 0.38 -0.069 -0.51 0.61 
BornOAnonEngl*Egraddiplomagai
ned -0.082 -0.67 0.51 -0.040 -0.31 0.76 
BornOAnonEnglish*Ecertificategai
ned -0.199 -0.99 0.32 -0.094 -0.44 0.66 
BornOAnonEnglish*Eadvdiplomag
ained -0.124 -0.80 0.43 -0.067 -0.41 0.68 
Study*Disability -0.112 -0.99 0.32 -0.027 -0.18 0.86 
Study*BornOAEnglish 0.000 0.00 1.00 0.096 0.80 0.43 
Study*BornOAnonEnglish -0.054 -0.63 0.53 -0.104 -0.87 0.39 
Tenure 0.121 24.03 0.00 0.127 24.68 0.00 
Tenure Squared -0.003 -16.10 0.00 -0.003 -16.21 0.00 
Tenure*Female 0.003 0.49 0.63 0.005 0.68 0.50 
Tenure Squared *Female -0.001 -3.47 0.00 -0.001 -3.51 0.00 
Tenure *Disability -0.039 -2.54 0.01 -0.035 -2.25 0.02 
Tenure Squared *Disability 0.001 1.89 0.06 0.001 1.59 0.11 
Tenure *BornOAEnglish 0.007 0.57 0.57 0.009 0.67 0.51 
Tenure Squared *BornOAEnglish 0.000 -0.55 0.59 0.000 -0.60 0.55 
Tenure *BornOAnonEnglish 0.013 1.21 0.23 0.017 1.46 0.14 
Tenure Squared *BornOAnonEngl 0.000 -1.14 0.25 0.000 -1.27 0.20 
Female*Disability 0.092 -0.92 0.36 0.083 -0.84 0.40 
Female *BornOAEnglish 0.013 -0.16 0.87 0.009 -0.11 0.91 
Female *BornOAnonEnglish 0.042 -0.61 0.54 0.053 -0.75 0.45 
Ephd Entry -   0.171 0.98 0.33 
Emasters Entry -   0.231 2.80 0.01 
Ebachelor Entry -   0.337 9.82 0.00 
Egraddiploma Entry -   0.099 2.07 0.04 
Eadvdiploma Entry -   0.018 0.37 0.71 
Ecertificate Entry -   -0.108 -2.49 0.01 
Female*Ephd Entry -   -0.035 -0.18 0.86 
Female *Emasters Entry -   0.069 0.60 0.55 
Female *Ebachelor Entry -   0.053 0.97 0.33 
Female *Egraddiploma Entry -   0.034 0.44 0.66 
Female *Ecertificate Entry -   0.131 2.04 0.04 
Female *Eadvdiploma Entry -   0.005 0.07 0.95 
Disability*Ephd Entry -   0.429 1.29 0.20 
Disability*Emasters Entry -   -0.120 -0.33 0.74 
Disability*Ebachelor Entry -   0.142 1.14 0.25 
Disability*Egraddiploma Entry -   0.243 1.50 0.13 
Disability*Ecertificate Entry -   0.099 0.80 0.42 
Disability*Eadvdiploma Entry -   -0.061 -0.33 0.74 
BornOAEnglish*Ephd Entry -   0.146 0.57 0.57 
BornOAEnglish*Emasters Entry -   0.015 0.09 0.93 
BornOAEnglish*Ebachelor Entry -   0.053 0.56 0.57 
BornOAEngl*Egraddiploma Entry -   -0.087 -0.69 0.49 
BornOAEnglish*Ecertificate Entry -   0.032 0.28 0.78 
BornOAEngl*Eadvdiploma Entry -   0.147 1.16 0.24 
BornOAnonEnglish*Ephd Entry -   0.475 2.09 0.04 
BornOAnonEngl*Emasters Entry -   0.219 1.53 0.13 
BornOAnonEngl*Ebachelor Entry -   0.101 1.09 0.28 
BornOAnonEnglish*Egraddiploma 
Entry -   0.150 1.21 0.23 
BornOAnonEnglish*Ecertificate 
Entry -   0.357 3.34 0.00 
BornOAnonEnglish*Eadvdiploma 
Entry -   0.239 1.92 0.05 
Studyassistfinancial -   0.222 3.73 0.00 
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Studyassistfinancial*Female -   0.007 0.08 0.94 
Studyassistfinancial*Disability -   -0.105 -0.51 0.61 
Studyassistfinancial*BornOAEnglis
h -   -0.111 -0.71 0.48 
Studyassistfinancial*BornOAnonEn
glish -   0.107 0.70 0.49 
 
